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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows,
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifiying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
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Photo I: I,aunch of Shuttle Mission STS-78

1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 19 June
1996. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the primary flight elements
OV-102 Columbia (20th flight), ET-79 (LWT 72), and BI-081 SRB's. There were no significant
vehicle or pad anomalies.
1PR 78V-0134 documented K5NA trimmings from SRB IEA cover closeouts on both right and
left aft booster stub rings and stiffener rings. Two pieces of K5NA, including the largest piece
measuring 0.75-inches long by 0.75-inches wide by 0.50-inches thick, were within reach and
removed by pad personnel. The 1PR was dispositioned to fly as-is based on the debris location and
highly improbable impact threat _o the Orbiter. Examination of the IEA closeout revealed no flight
hardware nonconformance condition.
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 20 June 1996. There were no Launch Commit Criteria
(LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were taken. No acreage icing or
frost conditions were expected due to the late morning launch time. There were no ice/frost
conditions or protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
After the 10:49 a.m (local) launch on 20 June 1996, a debris walk down of Pad 39B was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. All the T-0 umbilicals operated
properly. Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal.
A total of 105 films and videos were analyzed as part &the post mission data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
SSME #3 had a '_zold start" causing the Mach diamond to form later than usual just prior to the
SSME #2 Mach diamond.
A stud hang-up occurred on hoiddown post #5. Two semi-circular pieces of aluminum from the
SRB aft skirt stud hole fell downward between the aft skirt and the holddown post #5 shoe. No
ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS while in the field of view. The
holddown post shoe lifted approximately 2 inches. No stud hang-ups or frangible nut/ordnance
debris was observed on any of the other holddown posts.
Orbiter umbilical camera films showed nominal separation of SRB's from the External Tank and
normal separation of the ET from the Orbiter.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. The number of MSA-2
debonds on the right frustum was less than average. The number of MSA-2 debonds on the left
frustrum was somewhat greater than average with a large percentage of this number consisting of
partial debonds on the leading edge of the fasteners
Orbiter performance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and
rollout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal.
A post landing inspection of OV-102 was conducted 7 July 1996 on SLF runway 33 at the
Kennedy Space Center. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 85 hits, of which 12 had a major
dimension of l-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous
missions of similar configuration, both the total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger was less than average.
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TheOrbiterlower surfacesustaineda total of 35hits,of which5 hada majordimensionof 1-inch
or larger.Thelargestlowersurfacetile damagesitewaslocatedaft of the ET/ORBumbilicalsand
measured2.5-incheslong by 0.5-incheswide by 0.5-inchmaximumdepth.Thedamagewasmost
likely causedby anice impactfrom theumbilicals.
ET/Orbiter separationdevices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance
fragmentswere found on the runway beneaththe umbilicalcavities.All ET/Orbiter umbilical
separationordnanceretentionshutterswereclosedproperly.
The SSME #1 Dome MountedHeat Shield(DM-HS)closeoutblanketswere torn and frayedat
the 7:00 o'clock position. Significanttearing and fraying to the SSME #3 DMHS blankets
occurredfrom 7:00 to 12:00o'clock. Althoughthe facepanelswere still attached,someof the
underlyingbattingmaterialmaybemissing.TheSSME#2DIVIHSblanketswereundamaged.
Orbiter post landingmicrochemicalsampleresultsrevealeda varietyof residualsin the Orbiter
window samplesfrom the facility environment,SRBBSM exhaust,Orbiter RCS nozzlecover
adhesive,OrbiterTPS,andpaints/primersfrom varioussources.Theseresidualsamplingdatado
not indicatea singlesourceof damagingdebrisasall of the notedmaterialshavepreviouslybeen
documentedin post-landingsamplereports."Fheresidualsampledata showedno debris trends
whencomparedto previousmissiondata.
A total of ninePostLaunchAnomalies,but no In-FlightAnomalies(IFA's), wereobservedduring
the STS-78missionassessment.
2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 19 June 1996 at 0900 hours. The following personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in this
document.
J. Tatum NASA - KSC
G Katnik NASA - KSC
J. Lin NASA - KSC
B. Davis NASA - KSC
R. Speece NASA - KSC
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M. Valdivia USA- SPC
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J. Blue USA - SPC
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M. Wollam USA- SPC
G. Fales USA- SPC
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Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
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Digital Imaging Systems
Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems
ET Mechanisms/Structures
ET Mechanisms/Structures
Level II Integration
Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
Rockwell LSS Systems Integration
Rockwell LSS Systems Integration
THIO - LSS SRM Processing
LMSO - LSS ET Processing
3.0 LAUNCH
STS-78 was launched at 96:172:14:49:00.019 GMT (10:49 am local) on 20 June 1996.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 19 June
1996 The detailed walkdown of Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the primary flight elements
OV-102 Columbia (20th flight), ET-79 (LWT 72), and BI-081 SRB's There were no significant
vehicle or launch pad anomalies.
DR DI-6-004162 documented a misaligned bolt hole on the B-2 camera position (film item E-7)
due to a warped blast cover. The bolt could not be installed. Design Engineering evaluated the
condition and determined the blast cover could sustain launch without the bolt. The hole was
redrilled and a standard size bolt was installed after launch.
IPR 78V-0134 documented K5NA trimmings from SRB IEA cover closeouts on both right and
left aft booster stub rings and stiffener rings. Two pieces of K5NA, including the largest piece
measuring 0.75-inches long by 0.75-inches wide by 0.50-inches thick, were within reach and
removed by pad personnel. The IPR was dispositioned to fly as-is based on the debris location and
highly improbable impact threat to the Orbiter. Examination of the IEA closeout revealed no flight
hardware nonconformance condition.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 20 June 1996 from _3605 to
0735 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or
TPS IPR's were taken. No acreage icing or frost conditions were expected due to the ambient
conditions at this time of year. There were no protuberance icing conditions outside of the
established data base.
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual
temperature gradients.
3.2.1 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. Less than usual ice/frost had formed on
the SSME heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature
gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the STI radiometers averaged 73-80 degrees F.
Temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl) ranged from
73-78 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement.
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature supplied by THIO was 77 degrees F, which
was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a general comparison to
infrared scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
TheFinal InspectionTeamobserved light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LO2 tank. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 58-68 degrees F. An area of LO2 tank CPR
measuring 3 degrees F less than the surrounding foam was observed using the infrared radiometer
in the -Y+Z quadrant. The area extended from the LO2 tank-to-intertank flange to the ogive and
was approximately 8 feet wide. However, no anomalies, such as ice/frost accumulation, were
visible.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Ice/frost accumulation on the GUCP was less
than usual.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, but no ice or frost
accumulation, was present on the acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 53-66 degrees
F. There were no anomalies on the new method bipod jack pad standoff closeouts. New foam
(PDL- 1034/S S- 1171 alternate blowing agent foams) applied to the ET/SRB att fairing closeouts,
bipod jack pad closeouts, -Y ET/SRB aft fairings, and the LH2 umbilical cable tray appeared
nominal.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support
brackets.
No stress relief crack had formed in the -Y vertical strut forward surface TPS.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the separation
bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable
replenish, and launch.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which were all acceptable for launch per
the NSTS-08303 criteria, included no OTV recorded items.
3.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch.
No leaks were observed on the GUCP or either of the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.
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Pholo 2: El" Nose Cone Topcoat Configuralion
Loose topcoat was removed and the GOX vent seal footprint repaired/rc-topcoatcd
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Photo 3: Bipod .Jack Pad Standoff Closcouts
First flight or'tile nexs method ack pad standottcloseouts
[4
I
Photo 4:STS-78 Cryoloaded for Lalnnch
OV-102 Columbia (20th flight), ET-T9 (I,W I' 72), and BI-081 SRB's
O

Photo 5:ET-79 Cryoloaded for Launch
l.ight condensate, but no ice ol frost accumulation, was present on tile 1.()2 tank TPS surface
temperatures ranged from 58-08 degrees Fahrenheit
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Photo 6: Overall View of SSME's
II

Photo 7: Orbiter Lower Surface Tiles
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
Thepost launchinspectionof theMLP, FSS, RSS, and Pad B crawlerway/acreage was conducted
on 20 June 1996 for two hours starting at Launch + 2 hours.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
South SRB holddown post and shoe erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe shim material was
intact. A HDP stud hang-up was expected on holddown post #2 based on the observations of the
post launch assessment team and the vehicle li_off lateral acceleration of 0.30g's reported by
Rockwell-Downey. Two areas of gouged/raised material were also observed on the edge of the
HDP #1 stud hole. All of the north HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position.
Erosion of the blast covers was typical.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) and GOX Vent Arm (GVA) appeared
undamaged. No topcoat from the External Tank nose cone adhered to the GOX seals.
The GH2 vent line had no loose cables (static retract lanyard), and appeared to have latched
properly with no rebound. The GUCP leg crossbeam showed signs of contact by the static retract
lanyard. The vent line was latched on the seventh tooth of the latching mechanism. The RSS cable
had disconnected properly.
Typical pad damage included:
Two broken lights on the pad northeast slope
Damaged cable tray panel cover on the FSS 115 foot level
Metal strap from OIS box on FSS 135 foot level
Overall, damage to the pad appeared to be minimal.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the film review. Post flight anomalies are listed in Section 9.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 80 films and videos, which included twenty-six 16mm films, fifteen 35mm films, and
thirty-nine videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
SSME #3 had a "cold start" causing the Mach diamond to form later than usual just prior to the
SSME #2 Mach diamond (E-63).
A noticeable amount of free burning hydrogen drifted upward and outboard of SSME #2 during
ignition (E-16, -18). Free burning hydrogen drifted upward from SSME #1 to the OMS pod
(OTV 151, 163, 170, 171).
Three light spots on the SSME #3 hatbands and drain line were attributed to sunlight on the
nozzle (E- 19).
Small pieces of tile surface coating material were lost from 4 places on the base heat shield near
SSME #2 (E-18).
SSME ignition caused pieces of ice to fall from the ET/ORB umbilicals. Several pieces of ice
contacted the LH2 umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward. No tile damage was visible.
(OTV 109, 164).
A f0am-colored piece of debris and a white object entered the camera field of view right side at
14:48:55.439 and 14:48:57.452 GMT, respectively, moving in a +Y direction. Both objects were
unfocused and are believed to have passed close to the camera lens. No contact with either the
vehicle or LH2 TSM -Z side was observed (E-18).
A part of the LH2 TSM purge barrier, with tape along the edge, came loose and was visible above
the LH2 T-0 umbilical during SSME startup (E-18).
A flexible piece of debris, probably a piece of SRB sound suppression water trough, was ejected
out of the LH SRB exhaust hole at T-0, appeared to contact the Orbiter lower surface, and was
deflected upward a short distance before falling aft. No tile damage was visible (E-31, frame
1408; E-36, 49:00.737 GMT).
There was no discernible damage to TPS on the ET nose cone, fairing, or footprint area after the
GVA was retracted (OTV 160, 162).
GUCP disconnect from the ET was nominal. Frost-covered foam, but no damage, was visible in
the area after retraction. (OTV 104; E-33).
The Orbiter LH2 and LO2 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly (OTV 149, 150,
170, 171).
A stud hang-up occurred on holddown post #5. Two semi-circular pieces of aluminum from the
SRB aft skirt stud hole fell downward between the aft skirt and the holddown post #5 shoe. No
ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS while in the field of view. The
holddown post shoe lifted approximately 2 inches (E-12, -l 3).
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No studhang-upsor frangiblenut/ordnancedebriswasobservedon anyof the otherholddown
posts.
Numerouspiecesof SRBthroatplugmaterialandshreddedSRBsoundsuppressionwatertrough
materialwere ejectedout of the SRB exhaustholes. Someof the piecesmoved toward the
vehicle,but nocontactwasobserved(E-l, -15, -16, -52).
Vapor streamedaft from theOrbiterLO2 T-0 from liftoffthrough theroll maneuver(E-52).
Large piecesof ET/ORBumbilicalpurgebarriermaterialfell all at T+I 3 throughT+I 7 seconds
MET (E-52,-213).
The objectfalling throughthe E-222 field of view at T+23 secondsMET is closeto the camera
andnot nearthe vehicle.Likewise,numerousbirdsin the areaat lilloff did not appearto beclose
to thevehicle.
Numerouspiecesof instafoamfrom the SRBaft skirt areafell alongsidethe SRBplumesduring
ascent(E-54).
Six flaresoccurredin the SSMEplumeduringascent(E-213,-222).
Body flap movement(amplitudeand frequency)appearedsimilar to previous flights (E-213,
-220, -223).
Localized flow condensationcollars at various points on the vehiclewere expectedfor the
ambientweatherconditions(E-213,-220,-223,-224;OTV 4B, OTV 21).
ExhaustplumerecirculationandSRBseparationappearednormal.Numerouspiecesof slagwere
visiblefalling from theSRBnozzlesandexhaustplumeafterseparation(OTV 13;E-208, -212).
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4Photo 8: Holddown Post #5 Stud Hangup
A stud hang-up occurred on holddown post #5. Two semi-circular pieces of aluminum from the
SRB all skirt stud hole fell downward between the all skirt and the HDP #5 shoe (arrow). No
ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS while in the field of view.
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
OV-102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm
motion picture with 10mm lens; 35mm still views. Data was obtained from all three cameras.
Handheld photography by the flight crew consisted of still images and video.
SRB separation from the External Tank was nominal.
ET-79 separation from the Orbiter was also nominal.
The new method bipod jack pad standoff closeouts were intact and undamaged.
Shallow divots, 4 to 6 inches in diameter were observed in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange
closeout: one in the +Y+Z quadrant, two in the -Y+Z quadrant, and one in the general vicinity
(forward) of the -Y bipod jack pad closeout area.
The red purge barrier seal around the EO-3 fitting came loose during ET separation.
The appearance of new (uncharred) foam on both aft fairing splice plate closeouts is believed to
be the result of the thin, charred surface layer of foam flaking away during ascent rather than
divoting. Application of the new PDL foam in the splice plate closeouts, along with the bipod jack
pad standoff closeouts, was successful.
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition after separation with no TPS
damage. Typically, foam was eroded from the horizontal (clamshell) section of the cable tray and
the aft surface of the -Y vertical strut.
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical sustained TPS damage during separation at the forward outboard
corner. Numerous divots and eroded areas were visible on the horizontal and vertical sections of
the cable tray. Lightning contact strips across the forward part of the umbilical and at the 8:00
o'clock position were missing. Loss of lightning contact strips has been the subject of previous
IFA's.
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Photo 9:LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical After Separation
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition after separation with no TPS
damage. Typically, foam was eroded from the horizontal (clamshell) section of the cable tray and
the aft surface of the -Y vertical strut
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Photo10:LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical After Separation
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical sustained TPS damage during separation at the forward outboard
corner (I). Lightning contact strips across the forward part of the umbilical and at the 8:00
o'clock position were missing (2). Loss of lightning contact strips has been the subject of previous
IFA's. The red purge barrier seal around the EO-3 fitting came loose during separation (3). The
appearance of new (uncharted) foam on both all fairing splice plate closeouts is believed to be the
result of the thin, charred surface layer of foam flaking away during ascent rather than divoting (4)
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Photo 11: ET lntertank
The new method bipod jack pad standoff closeouts were intact and undamaged. Shallow divots, 4
to 6 inches in diameter were observed in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout: one in the
+Y+Z quadrant (1), two in the -Y+Z quadrant (2), and one in the general vicinity (forward) of the
-Y bipod jack pad closeout area (3).
2O

Photo 12: ET After Separation
ET-79 separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal No anomalies were detected in the LO2
tank, intertank, and LH2 tank acreage CPR The BSM burn scar on the LO2 tank barrel section
was typical
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 23 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, two 16mm high
speed films, and twelve videos, were reviewed.
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the
Orbiter during final approach. Left and right main landing gear touchdown was virtually
simultaneous (right side touched down first) at approximately 2200 feet. The Orbiter drifted east
of centerline during rollout then was steered back to centerline.
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
No significant TPS damage was visible. The reddish-brown discoloration from a previous flight
on the forward section of the left payload bay door appeared unchanged. Rollout and wheel stop
were uneventful.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-081 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at
CCAYS Hangar AF on 24 June 1996. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in excellent
condition.
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS. The number of debonds over fasteners (25) was less than
average (Figure 1). Hypalon paint was blistered/missing along the XB-395 ring frame where BTA
closeouts had been applied. However, most of the exposed BTA substrate was not sooted. The
BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
The RH forward skin exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic
base plates were intact though some of the phenolic layers had delaminated. Hypalon paint was
blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied. No pins or retainer clips
were missing from the severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ETA ring, IEA, and lEA covers
appeared undamaged. Several stiffener rings had been damaged by water impact. The aft booster
stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
Aft skirt MSA-2 was intact. More than usual amounts of foam were missing.from the aft skirt ait
ring. Launch films showed numerous light colored particles, believed to be pieces of foam, falling
along side the SRB plumes during ascent.
The HDP #1 and #3 Debris Containment Systems (DCS) plungers were obstructed by frangible
nut halves and a 2-inch long by 1-inch wide by 1/4-inch thick piece of K5NA, respectively. No
anomalies on HDP #1 and #3 were observed in the launch films and the two conditions may have
been caused by water impact. The HDP #2 and t#4 DCS functioned properly.
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Figure 1: RH SRB Frustum
24

Photo 13: RH Frustum
The RH frustum was missing no TPS The number of debonds over fasteners (25) was less than
average. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing along the XB-395 ring frame where BTA closeouts
had been applied. However, most of the exposed BTA substrate was not sooted The BSM aero
heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
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Photo 14: RH Forward Skirt
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic
base plates were intact though some of the phenolic layers were delaminated. Hypaion paint was
blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied. No pins or retainer clips
were missing from the frustum severance ring.
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Photo 15: Effects of Nozzle Severance
Hot or burning debris from nozzle severance prior to splashdown left charred residue and scorch
marks on the SRM cases/systems tunnel closeouts
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Photo 16: Aft Skirt Aft Ring Missing Foam
More than usual amounts of foam were missing from the aft skirt af_ ring. Launch iilms showed
numerous light colored particles, believed to be pieces of foam, falling along side the SRB plumes
during ascent
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Photo 17: RH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS. The number of MSA-2 debonds over fasteners (42) was
somewhat greater than average with a large percentage of this number consisting of partial
debonds on the leading edge of the fasteners (Figure 2). Hypalon paint was blistered/missing
along the XB-395 ring frame where BTA cioseouts had been applied. However, most of the
exposed BTA substrate was not sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully
opened position though the two right cover attach tings had been bent by parachute entanglement.
The LH forward skirt exhibited no TPS debonds. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates
were intact though some of the phenolic layers had delaminated. Hypalon paint was
blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied. No pins or retainer clips
from the frustum severance ring were missing or damaged.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FYPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers
appeared undamaged. Several stiffener tings had been damaged by water impact. The stiffener
ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
Aft skirt MSA-2 was intact. More than usual amounts of foam were missing from the aft skirt aft
ring. Launch films showed numerous light colored particles, believed to be pieces of foam, falling
along side the SRB plumes during ascent.
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #5 and the hole was broached. Stud impressions were visible in
the stud hole wall. The stud hang-up was confirmed in the launch film review on film item E-12.
The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger, which was seated, pinched an orange seal
from the plunger assembly. The remaining DCS appeared to have functioned properly and all the
plungers were seated.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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Figure 2: LH SRB Frustum
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Photo 18: LIt Frustum
The LH frustum was missing no TPS Fhe number of MSA-2 debonds ovel fasteners (42) was
somewhat greater than average with a large percentage of this number consisting of partial
debonds on the leading edge of the fasteners. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the
fully opened position though the two right cover attach rings had been bent by parachute
entanglement
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Photo 19: LH Forward Skirt
The [,H tbrward skirt exhibited no TPS debonds Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates
were intact though some of the phenolic layers had delaminated I lypalon paint was
blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied No pins or retainer clips
from the frustum severance ring were missing or damaged
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Photo 20: Ltl Aft Booster/Aft Skirl
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Photo 21: HDP #5 Stud Hole Broaching
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #5 and the stud hole was broached• Stud impressions were
visible in the stud hole wall (arrow). The stud hang-up was confirmed in the launch film review.
The HDP DCS plunger, which was seated, pinched an orange seal from the plunger assembly.
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing inspection of OV-102 Columbia was conducted 7-9 July 1996 at the Kennedy
Space Center on SLF runway 33 and in the Orbiter Processing Facility bay #1. This inspection
was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS
sustained a total of 85 hits, of which 12 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. This total does
not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and
exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from 62 previous
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 261L 27tL 30tL and 42,
which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the total number of hits and the
number of hits 1-inch or larger were significantly less than average (reference attached figures).
The following table breaks down the STS-78 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > l" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 5 35
Upper surface 3 34
Right side 0 2
Left side 3 4
Right OMS Pod 0 5
Let_ OMS Pod 1 5
TOTALS 12 85
The largest lower surface tile damage site was located aft of the ET/ORB umbilicals and
measured 2.5-inches long by 0.5-inches wide by 0.5-inch maximum depth. The damage was most
likely caused by an ice impact from the umbilicals.
Tile damage sites aft of the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals, usually, caused by impacts from
umbilical ice or shredded pieces of umbilical purge barrier material flapping in the airstream, were
less than usual in number and size.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was identified during this inspection.
The tires and brakes were reported to be in average condition for a landing on the KSC concrete
runway. Ply undercutting occurred on the iet_ MLG inboard tire.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. Two clips were
missing from the EO-2 'Salad bowl" fitting. No ordnance fragments were found on the runway
beneath the umbilical cavities. However, several pieces of purge barrier material held together
with mylar tape lay on the runway beneath the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Debris, which appeared to
be a small piece of lockwire adhering to a piece of mylar tape, was wedged between the forward
16mm camera lens and window. The field of view for both SRB and ET separation may have been
obstructed. Virtually no umbilical closeout foam or white RTV dam material adhered to the
umbilical plate near the LH2 recirculation line disconnect.
36
The SSME #1 Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were torn and frayed at
the 7:00 o'clock position. Significant tearing and fraying to the SSME #3 DMHS blankets
occurred from 7:00 to 12:00 o'clock. Although the face panels were still attached, some of the
underlying batting material may be missing. The SSME #2 DMHS blankets were undamaged.
Tiles on the vertical stabilizer %tinger" were intact and undamaged. However, one tile at the
+Y-Z corner of the drag chute cavity was chipped.
Damage to approximately half of one tile on the trailing edge of the left rudder/speed brake did
not appear related to drag chute deployment. A previous repair to that tile most likely shook loose
during SSME ignition and ascent.
No ice adhered to the payload bay door. The reddish-brown discoloration on the leading edge of
,the LH payload bay door had not changed in appearance. No unusual tile damage was observed
on the leading edges of the vertical stabilizer and OMS pods.
A somewhat unusual finding was a tile damage site on the upper surface of the lett wing near the
leading edge but aft of the RCC panels. The damage site measured approximately 5-inches long
by 0.75-inches wide by 0.125-inches deep and was oriented in the longitudinal (-X) direction.
Hazing and streaking of Orbiter windows #2, #3, and #4 was typical. Damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles (five hits on window #2; five hits on #3; and four hits on #4) were
determined to be new hits. Numerous other damage sites were attributed to old repair material
flaking off. A tile between windows #3 and #4 exhibited a damage site 2-inches long by 1-inch
wide by 0.125-inches deep.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed immediately after landing. No debris
concerns were identified. All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have functioned
normally.
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger were significantly less than average when compared to previous missions.
Post Landing Anomalies are listed in Section 9.0.
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Figure 3: Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Map
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Figure 4: Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Map
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Figure 5: Orbiter Right Side Debris Map
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Figure 6: Orbiter Left Side Debris Map
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Figure 7: Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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Photo 22: Orbiter Left Side Midbody and Aft Fuselage
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Photo 23: Orbiter Right Side Midbody and Nose
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Photo 24: Base Heat Shield/SSME's
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Photo 25: SSME #3 DMHS Closeout Blankets
Significant tearing and fraying to the SSME #3 DMHS closeout blankets occurred from the 7:00
to 12:00 o'clock locations. Although the face panels were still attached, some of the underlying
batting material may be missing.
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Photo 26: FRCS Tile Damage
Tile damage site measuring 3 x 1 x 025 inches was located near the F3L thruster
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Photo 27:LH2 ET/ORB |lmbilical
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Photo 28:LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo29: Orbiter Windows
tlazing and streaking of Orbiter windows #2, #3, and #4 was typical. Damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles (five hits on window #2; five hits on #3; and four hits on #4) were
determined to be new hits. Numerous other damage sites were attributed to old repair material
flaking off A tile between windows #3 and #4 exhibited a damage site 2 x I x 0 125-inches deep
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!Photo 30: Damaged Tile on Rudder/Speed Brake
Damage to approximately half of one tile on the trailing edge of the left rudder/speed brake did
not appear related to drag chute deployment A previous repair to that tile most likely shook loose
during SSME ignition and ascent
51

8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-102 Columbia during the STS-78 post landing
debris assessment at Kennedy Space Center. The submitted samples consisted of 8 wipes from
Orbiter windows #1-8. The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis
Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis
involves both the placing and the correlating of particles and residues with respect to composition,
thermal (mission) effects, and availability. Debris sample results/analyses are listed by Orbiter
location in the following summaries.
8.1 ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust
(including metallic particulate), landing site materials (earth minerals), Orbiter Thermal Protection
System (tile repair, and glass insulation), Orbiter window polish residue, and building type
insulation. There was no apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
8.2 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the STS-78 organic analysis are pending.
8.3 STS-76 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the recently-received STS-76 organic sample analysis revealed the presence of
vinyl, insect debris and epoxy materials. These particulate types are common to STS processing
The precise sources are under assessment.
8.4 STS-77 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the recently-received STS-77 organic sample analysis revealed the presence of RTV
(RCS nozzle cover and ORB TPS), filled rubber and paints. These particulate types are common
to STS processing, the precise sources are under assessment.
8.5 NEW FINDINGS
Vinyl material as noted in STS-76 organic analysis is a new finding, precise source is under
investigation. These material types are common to the STS environment. The variety of residual
material continues to be representative of that documented in previous mission sampling
(reference Figure 8 for STS-78).
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9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, 9 post launch anomalies, but no In-Flight
Anomalies (IFA's), were observed on the STS-78 mission.
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
1. A foam-colored piece of debris and a white object entered the E-18 camera field of view right
side at 14:48:55.439 and 14:48:57.452 GMT, respectively, moving in a +Y direction. Both
objects were unfocused and are believed to have passed close to the camera lens. No contact with
either the vehicle or LH2 TSM -Z side was observed.
9.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
1. The LH frustum was missing no TPS. The number of MSA-2 debonds over fasteners (42) was
somewhat greater than average with a large percentage of this number consisting of partial
debonds on the leading edge of the fasteners.
2. More than usual amounts of foam were missing from the aft skirt aft ring. Launch films showed
numerous light colored particles, believed to be pieces of foam, falling along side the SRB plumes
during ascent.
3. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #5 and the hole was broached. Stud impressions were visible
in the stud hole wall. The stud hang-up was confirmed in the launch film review on film item
E-12. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger had pinched an orange seal from the
plunger assembly.
9.3 EXTERNAL TANK
1. Shallow divots, 4 to 6 inches in diameter were observed in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange
closeout: one in the +Y+Z quadrant, two in the -Y+Z quadrant, and one in the general vicinity
(forward) of the -Y bipod jack pad closeout area.
2. The red purge barrier seal around the EO-3 fitting came loose during ET separation.
3. The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical sustained TPS damage during ET separation at the forward
outboard comer. Numerous divots and eroded areas were visible on the horizontal and vertical
sections of the cable tray. Lightning contact strips across the forward part of the umbilical and at
the 8:00 o'clock position were missing. Loss of lightning contact strips has been the subject of
previous IFA's.
9.4 ORBITER
1. Debris, which appeared to be a small piece of lockwire adhering to a piece of mylar tape, was
wedged between the forward 16mm camera lens and window in the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The
field of view for both SRB and ET separation may have been obstructed.
2. A somewhat unusual finding was a tile damage site on the upper surface of the left wing near
the leading edge but aft of the RCC panels. The damage site measured approximately 5-inches
long by 0.75-inches wide by 0.125-inches deep and was oriented in the longitudinal (-X) direction.
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1. STS-78 (OV-102): Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
lJ
1.1.2
1.2
STS-78 (OV-102): FILM / VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
SCREENING ACTIVITIES
Launch
The STS-78 launch of Columbia (OV-102) from pad B occurred on Thursday,
June 20, 1996, (day 172) 14:49:00.028 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) as
seen on camera E9. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation occurred at
14:51:03.684 UTC as seen on camera KTV4B.
On launch day, 24 of 24 expected videos were received and screened. Following
launch day, 40 films were screened. Camera films E60, E76, and E212 were not
received. No potential anomalies were observed during launch.
Video of the Orbiter flight-deck taken during ascent from a camera mounted near
the commander's chair were down-linked by the crew. Vapors, probably from a
purge, were visible through Orbiter window W 1.
Detailed Test Objective 312, photography of SRB separation and the external tank
(ET) after separation, was performed using the Orbiter umbilical well cameras
(method 1). Handheld photography of the ET was acquired using the Nikon F4
with the 300 mm lens and 2x converter (method 3).
Landing
Columbia landed on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility on July 7,
1996. Twelve of twelve expected videos were received. A video from the pilot's
window of the landing was also received. Eleven films of the Orbiter's approach
and landing were received.
No major anomalies were noted in the approach, landing, or roll-out video views
screened. The drag chute deployment appeared normal.
TIMING ACTIVITIES
Launch:
The time codes from videos and films were used to identify specific events during
the initial screening process.
Video cameras: ET204, ET207, ET208, ET212, ET213, KTV2, KTV4B, KTV5,
KTV7B, KTV11B, KTV13, KTV21B, OTV109, OTV141, OTV148, OTV149,
OTV150, OTV151, OTV154, OTV160, OTV161, OTV163, OTV170, and
OTV 171 had IRIG timing.
Film cameras: E31, E41, E205, E207, E208, E213, E220, and E223 had IRIG
timing. El, E2, E3, E4, E5, E7, E8, E9, El0, E11, El2, El3, El4, El5, El6, E17,
El8, El9, E20, E33, E34, E36, E40, E52, E54, E57, E59, E62, E63, E77, E222,
and E224 had in-frame alphanumeric timing.
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1. STS-78 (OV-102): Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
Landing:
Video cameras: Eleven of the twelve expected videos screened on landing day
(EL17IR, EL18IR, KTV5L, KTV6L, KTV11L, KTV12L, KTV13L, KTV15L,
KTV20L, KTV33L, and SLF South) had IJLIG timing. SLF North did not have
IRIG timing.
Film cameras: The eleven film cameras of landing (EL1, EL2, EL4, EL7, EL8,
EL9, EL 10, EL 12, EL 15, EL30, and EL31) had in-frame alphanumeric timing.
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2.
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Landing Gear - Doors Opened
Right Main Wheel Touchdown
Left Main Wheel Touchdown
Drag Chute Initiation
Pilot Chute at Full Inflation
Bag Release
Drag Chute Inflation in Reefed
Configuration
Drag Chute Inflation in
Disreefed Configuration
Nose Wheel Touchdown
Drag Chute Release
Wheel Stop
Table 1.2
189:12:36:14.622
189:12:36:33.945
189:12:36:34.212
189:12:36:39.709
189:12:36:40.609
189:12:36:41.210
189:12:36:42.145
189:12:36:45.615
189:12:36:47.008
189:12:37:11.599
189:12:37:31.985
Landing Video Timing Events
KTV33L
EL 18IR
EL18IR
KTV 11L
KTV6L
KTV11L
KTV11L
KTV11L
KTV11L
KTV 15L
KTV 15L
I
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2. Summary of Significant Events
.
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.1.1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFI('ANT EVENTS
DEBRIS
Debris Near the Time of SSME Ignition
As on previous missions, multiple pieces ol debris were seen near the time of
SSME ignition. Most of the debris was umbilical ice and RCS paper No follow
up action was requested.
Object Contacts Vertical Stabilizer
(Cameras: OTV 171 and E77)
Figure 2.1.1.1 Object Contacts Vertical Stabilizer
A hght colored object, first seen between SSME #1 and SSME #2, was seen to
contact the port side of the vertical stabilizer at SSME ignition ( 14:48:55.569
UTC). No damage to the vertical stabilizer was visible. No damage was found
on the vertical stabilizer at the point-of-contact on the post landing inspection
conducted at KSC. This object was probably a hydrogen ignitor spark and not
debris No follow-up action was requested.
m
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2. Summary of Significant Events
2.1.1.2 Purge Barrier Material Seen Near LH2 TSM T-0 Umbilical Lines
(Camera: El 8)
2.1.2
2.1.2.1
Figure 2.1.1.2 Purge Barrier Material Near LH2 TSM T-0 Umbilical Lines
A piece of purge barrier material, with attached tape, from the LH2 TSM T-0
umbilical housing was seen near the LH2 TSM T-0 umbilical lines a! SSME
ignition ( 14:48:55.820 UTC). No follow-up action was requested.
Debris Near the Time of SRB Ignition
As on previous missions, multiple pieces of debris were seen neal the time of
SRB ignition. No follow-up action was requested.
Debris Contacts the Left Inboard Elevon and Body Flap
(Cameras: E 13 and E31 )
A single long, thin piece of debris appeared to contact the underside of the left
inboard elevon at liftoff (14:49:00.700 UTC). The debris was first seen near the
LSRB flame duct near holddown post M-6 (14:49:00.240 UTC). A second piece
of debris from the ET/Orbiter umbilical area was seen to glance off the body flap
at liftoff. No damage to the launch vehicle was noted, No follow-up action was
requested.
I
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2.1.2.2 RSRB Flame Duct Debris
(('amera: El, E3, E5, E7, El())
Figure 2.1.2.2 RSRB Flame Duct Debris
Multiple pieces of SRB flame duct debris were seen near the base of the RSRB at
lifloff. One relatively large piece appeared to travel close to the Orbiter body flap
(14:49:00.593 UTC). A linear shaped, dark colored, flexible piece of debris
traveled from the RSRB flame duct toward the Orbiter left wing before
disappearing behind the left TSM. None of the debris was seen to contact the
vehicle No follow-up action was requested
m
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2.1.2.3
2.1.2.4
Debris Contacts LH2 Umbilical Door Sill at Liftoff
(Camera: OTV 109)
A single piece of debris (probably ice) fell from the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical
and contacted the umbilical door sill at liftoff (14:49:00.674 UTC). No tile
damage was seen. Debris contacting the umbilical door sill has been seen on
previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
Debris Seen Near RSRB Holddown Post M-3 at Liftoff
(Camera: El0)
A small piece of dark debris was seen to fall from the RSRB holddown post M-3
foot area at liftoff (14:49:00.788 UTC). The debris did not appear to originate
from the DCS. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.3
2.1.3.1
Debris After Liftoff
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle
(SLV) after liftoff on the launch tracking views. The debris was probably
Reaction Control System (RCS) paper and ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals.
None of the debris was seen to contact the launch vehicle. No follow-up action
was requested.
Debris Seen in Exhaust Cloud after Liftoff
(Cameras: OTV141 and OTV171)
Several pieces of debris, one linear shaped, were seen in the exhaust cloud after
liftoff ( 14:49:02.072 and 14:49:11.385 UTC). No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.3.2
2.1.3.3
2.1.3.4
Debris Seen Near LSRB
(Camera: E52)
A single piece of debris was first seen near the aft section of the LSRB and fell
along the LSRB plume (14:49:13.832 UTC). No follow-up action was requested.
Multiple Pieces of Debris Seen Near RSRB Exhaust Plume
(Camera: E54)
Multiple pieces of debris (possibly SRB aft skirt instafoam) were seen
near the RSRB exhaust plume (14:49:20 - 14:49:24 UTC). No follow-up
action was requested.
Multiple Pieces of Debris Seen in SSME Exhaust Plume
(Cameras: E213 and E222)
Multiple pieces of debris (probably RCS paper) were seen in the SSME exhaust
plume after liftoff (14:49:22, 14:49:25, 14:49:27, 14:49:34 UTC). No follow-up
action was requested.
2.1.3.5 Debris Seen Aft of the Body Flap
(Cameras: E213 and E222)
Debris (possibly umbilical purge barrier material) was seen aft of the body flap at
14:49:30.649 UTC. No follow-up action was requested.
l
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2.1.3.6 Debris Seen Exiting the SRB Exhaust Plume
(Cameras: KTV4B and ET208)
;!
Figure 2.1.3.6 Debris Seen Exiting the SRB Exhaust Plume
A single light colored piece of debris was seen exiting the SRB exhaust plume
just prior to SRB separation ( 14:51:01.930 UTC). Debris aft of the launch vehicle
just prior to SRB separation has been seen on previous missions No followup
action was requested.
l
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MOBILE LAUNCH PI,ATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
Orange Vapor Seen Above the SSME Engine Bells
(Cameras: OTVI70, OTVI71, El6, E62 and E77)
2.2.2
2.2.3
Figure 2.2.1 Orange Vapor Seen Above the SSME Engine Bells
Orange vapor (probable fiee burning hydrogen) was seen above the SSME rims
during SSME ignition ( 14:48:54.8 UTC). Orange vapors have been seen on
previous missions. No follow-up action was requested
SSME Mach Diamond Formation
(Camera: E63)
The SSME Mach diamonds formed in sequence. The times of the Mach diamond
formation were:
SSME #3 Mach diamond formation
SSME #2 Mach diamond formation
SSME #1 Mach diamond formation
14:48:56.777 UTC
14:48:56.868 UTC
14:48:57.171 UTC
TPS Erosion on Base Heat Shield
(Camera' E 18)
Several small areas of TPS erosion were seen on the Orbiter base heal shield nero
SSME #2 during SSME start-up. The TPS erosion was less than that generally
seen on previous mission films. No follow-up action was requested.
IIIIII
STS-78 JSC Summary Report A 12

2. Summary of Significant Events
2.2.4 Bolt Hang-Up at Holddown Post M-5
(Cantata: E 12 )
Figure 2.2.4 Bolt Hang-Up tit Holddown Post M-5
A bolt hang-up was sect+ near the LSRB holddown post M-5 at liftofl
(14:49:00.619 UTC). A curved piece of debris fell from the holddown post shoe
Debris Containment System (DCS) area (14:49:00.667 tlTC). No follow-up
action was requested
MISSION
STS-34
STS-33
STS-39
STS-43
STS-45
STS-50
STS-46
STS-53
STS-73
STS-75
STS-76
LOCATION OF HANG-UP
RSRB holddown post M-2
RSRB holddown post M-3
RSRB holddown post M-1
LSRB holddown post M-7
RSRB holddown post M-4
RSRB holddown post M-4
LSRB holddown post M-7
RSRB holddown post M-1
RSRB holddown post M-2
LSRB holddown post M-5
LSRB holddown post M-5
Table 2.2.4 SRB Holddown Post Boll Hang-Ups Seen on Previous Missions
A bolt hang-up occurred at holddown post M-5 on three of the last four
Shuttle launches (STS-75, STS-76, and STS-78).
m
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2.2.5
2.2.6
Orange Flashes Seen in the SSME Exhaust Plume
(Camera: E3)
Two orange colored flashes were seen in the SSME #3 exhaust plume during
liftoff (14:49:01.030, 14:49:01.083 UTC). Flashes in the SSME exhaust plumes
have been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
Vapors from ET Vents
(Camera: E34, E59)
White vapor was seen coming from the ET intertank +ZZ vent during SSME
ignition (14:48:56.821 UTC). Vapors were seen coming from the external tank
GH2 vent arm port and the ET/intertank -Z vent during liftoff (14:49:02.252
UTC). Vapor from the external tank GH2 vent arm port and the ET/intertank -Z
vent have been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
mmm
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2.2.7 ET Tip Deflection Analysis (Task #6)
(Camera: E40)
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Table 2.2.7 ET Tip Deflection Analysis
To assist in the investigation of the STS-78 SRB heating anomaly, analysis was
performed to determine ET tip deflection ("ET twang") during SSME ignition to
liftoff. Analysis showed ET tip deflection to be a maximum lateral deflection of
32.5"+/- 0.5" and a tip deflection of 14.7" +/- 0.5" at T-0. The measured
maximum and T-0 deflections for STS-78 were within one standard deviation of
the deflections seen on previous missions.
ASCENT EVENTS
Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume
(Cameras: KTV4B, E213, E222 and E223)
Five flares, probably debris induced, were seen in the SSME exhaust plume
during ascent (14:49:21.848, 14:49:28:759, 14:49:33.210, 14:49:33.674, and
14:49:44.466 UTC). Flares in the SSME exhaust plume during ascent have been
seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
Flash seen in the SRB Exhaust Plume
(Cameras: ET207 and ET212)
An orange colored flash was seen in the SRB exhaust plume prior to SRB
separation (14:50:51.364 UTC). This event may be part of the normal SRB
I
STS-78 JSC Summary Report A 15
2. Summary of Significant Events
plume brightening seen prior to SRB separation. No follow-up action was
requested.
ONBOARI) PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK (I)TO-312)
Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera Films tTask #2)
Three rolls of STS-78 umbilical well camera fihn were acquired: tile l(mnn filln
t5mm lens) and the 16nnn fihn (10ram lens) from the L!t2 umbilical, and the
35ram fihn from the I,O2 umbilical, The +X translation maneuver was performed
on STS-78.
Good coverage of the LSRB separation was acquired. As on previous missions,
numerous light-colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) and dark debris
(probably charred insulation) were seen throughout the SRB film sequence.
Typical ablation and charring of the LH2 umbilical electric cable tray and the Y
ET/SRB vertical strut were seen. Vapor and multiple pieces of light-colored
debris were seen near the LSRB aft attach prior to ET separation.
Figure 2.4.1 (A) LO2 ET/O,biter Umbilical
Good coverage of the external tank separation was acquired. Two of the five
lightning contact strips were seen to be missing ( 12 O'clock and 8 O'clock
l
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positions) on the ET/Orbiter LO2 umbilical interface plate (1). Missing lightning
contact strips have been previously seen (as recently as STS-77) and are the
subject of a previous mission in-flight anomaly (IFA). The red seal around E0-3
ball joint fitting was seen to be missing (2). TPS erosion/divots were noted on
vertical section of the LO2 electric cable tray (3). Chipping of the TPS on the aft
two LO2 feedline flanges were noted (4). Possible TPS erosion/divots were seen
on the RSRB aft attach (5). Chipping of the TPS on the aft portion of the +Z side
of the LH2 tank and TPS erosion on the LH2 tank in the -Y direction of the LO2
feedline were seen (6). The charring of the ET aft dome (caused by aero-heating
during ascent) is typical of previous missions.
Figure 2.4.1 (B) ET Intertank Area
Divots on the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout under the forward bipod (1) and on
the +Y LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout were seen (2). Also two small divots in
the -Y direction from the forward bipod on the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeoul
were seen (3)_
I
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2.4.2
Figure 2.4.1 (C) LSRB Aft Attach Point
Vapor and multiple light-colored pieces of debris were seen near the LSRB aft
attach point prior to ET sepearation (l). TPS ablation was noted on the LH2
ET/ORB umbilical cable tray (2). A piece of white debris (frozen hydrogen)
struck the forward surface of the LH2 cable tray (3). No damage to the cable
tray was noted.
_nalysis of Handheld Photography of the ET (Task #3)
One roll of STS-78 handheld photography was taken using the Nikon F4 with the
300 mm lens plus 2X extender. A DTO-312 pitch maneuver was performed to
bring the external tank into view. Thirty-eight usable frames were acquired for
analysis.
l
STS-78 JSC Summary Report A 18

2. Summary of Significant Events
Figure 2.4.2 (A) Handheld View of the External Tank
The first picture was taken approximately 14.3 minutes after liftoff ( 15:03:17
UTC). All aspects of the external tank were imaged. The external tank appeared
to be in good condition on the handheld views.
l
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STS-78 ET/Orbiter Separation
(5.54 m/s)
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Figure 2.4.2 (B) ET Separation Velocity
21:12 22:38 24:05
The distance of the external tank was calculated over a thirty-eight frame
sequence using the hand held photography. The external tank was calculated to
be a distance of 1.4 km away from the Orbiter at 14:17 MET. The tank was
calculated 582 seconds later (23:59 MET) to be at a distance of 4.6 km. The tank
separation velocity was determined to be 5.5 m/s. The separation velocity was
similar to previous mission measurements. The tank tumble rate was determined
to be 0.7 deg/sec and roll rate was determined to be 0.5 deg/sec.
LANDING EVENTS
Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #1)
The main and nose gear sink rates of the Orbiter were determined using landing
film over a one-second time period prior to main gear touchdown.
The measured main gear sink rate values were found to be below the maximum
allowable values of 9.6 ft/sec for a 229,200 lb. vehicle and 6.0 ft/sec for a 240,000
lb. vehicle (the landing weight of the STS-78 Orbiter was reported to be 221,910
lb.). The sink rate measurements for STS-78 are given in Table 2.5.1. In Figure
2.5.1 (A), and 2.5.1 (B), the trend of the measured data points for film image data
is illustrated.
i
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Prior to Touchdown
(1/4 Second)
Sink Rate: Film
Main Gear 1.65 ft/sec
Nose Gear 5.61 ft/sec
Table 2.5.1 Sink Rate Measurements
STS-78 Main Gear Sink Rate From Film
(Camera EL9)
1.62 f/s
1.65 f/s
- 1 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 0
TimcRclative to Main Gear Touchdown (seconds)
. m
,_height ...... trend 1.0s ..... trend 0 5s "trend 0.25s
Figure 2.5.1(A) Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown (Film)
I
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5 -
STS-78 Nose Gear Sink Rate From Film
(Camera EL7)
3.59 f/s
4.5-
4 -
----_3 5 __1_ A 4,54 f/s
_2.5 I " ,
i _ _,A 561 ,is
0.5- "_-.
o _.t
-1.0 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2
Time Relative to Nose Gear Touchdown (seconds)
i_height ...... trend 1.0s ..... trend 0.5s_trend 0.25s
-0.1 0.0
Figure 2.5.1(B) Nose Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown (Film)
2.6 OTHER
2.6.1 Normal Events:
Other normal events observed include: frost on and around the ET vent louvers,
frost on the ET LO2 barrel and LH2 tank acreage TPS (+.Y side), ice and vapor
from the ET/Orbiter umbilical areas from SSME ignition through lifloff, inboard
and outboard elevon motion at SSME ignition, body flap motion during SSME
ignition and at liftoff, SRB flame duct and MLP debris at liftoff, ET twang,
multiple pieces of light-colored debris falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0
umbilicals at disconnect, ET aft dome outgassing and vapor off the SRB stiffener
rings during lifloff, vapor and ice from the GUCP area during ET GH2 vent arm
retraction, vapor from the ET vent louver at liftoff, expansion waves after liftoff,
acoustic waves at liftoff, roll maneuver, linear optical effects, ET aft dome
charring, recirculation, SRB plume brightening prior to SRB separation, SRB
separation, and SRB slag material after SRB separation.
Normal Pad Events Observed Were:
Hydrogen burn ignitor operation, FSS deluge water operation, GH2 vent arm
retraction, and MLP deluge water operation, and sound suppression system water
operation. J-Pipe water leaks were seen near the RSRB holddown posts M-3 and
the LSRB holddown posts M-7 and M-8.
I
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APPENDIX B. MSFC PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SUMMARY
B

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Marsnalt Space Flight Center, AL 35812
_ ..o,_::,_of EP42 (96-26) July 16, 1996
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Distribution
EP42/Thomas J. Rieckhoff
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-78
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-78, the twentieth
flight of the Orbiter Columbia occurred on June 20, 1996, at
approximately 9:49 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch
Complex 39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Photographic and video coverage was evaluated to determine
proper operation of the MSFC related flight hardware.
Film was received from fifty-seven requested cameras as
well as video from twenty-four requested cameras. Camera E-212
experienced a film jam and E-223 had a short run. The northern
tracking cameras were partially obscured by clouds during
ascent. The southern tracking cameras were hazy because of high
atmospheric moisture content. Therefore, the data from the
long-range tracking cameras was decreased.
Film from the 16mm cameras located in the LH2 umbilical
well recorded the SRB separation and ET separation. The
astronauts recorded thirty-eight frames of the ET after
separation using the hand-help 35mm camera. All surfaces of the
ET were imaged with good quality photographs.
The typical events of butcher paper and baggie material
falling from the vehicle, debris induced streaks in the SSME
plume, and glowing debris particles exiting the SRM plume were
noted.
A loose wir& or rope was observed near the LO2 TSM
umbilical door prior to liftoff.
Venting of white vapors was noted at the ET -Z aero vent
prior to liftoff. This venting has been observed on previous
missions.
Holddown post M-5 hung up at liftoff. The stud moved in a
+Z direction after being released and fell into the hole.
B1
The following event times were acquired.
M-I PIC Firing
M-2 PIC Firing
M-5 PIC Firing
M-6 PIC Firing
SRB separation
14:49:00.028
14:49:00.027
-4:49:00.028
14:49:00.029
14:51:03.72
DATA SOURC_
Camera E-9
Camera E-8
Camera E-12
Camera E-13
Camera E-208
This report and additional information are available on the
World Wide Web at URL:
http://photo4, ms fc. nasa. gov/STS/sts78/sts78, html.
For further information concerning this report contact Tom
Rieckhoff @t 54_-_77 or Jeff Hixson, Rockwell at 971-3082.
 LII/
Thomas J. Rle_khoff
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